Packet-Hiding Methods for Preventing Selective Jamming Attacks

Abstract
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically referred to as
jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting Denial-of-Service
attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries with
internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect
and counter. In this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the
adversary is active only for a short period of time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the advantages
of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective
attack on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by performing real-time packet
classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet classification
by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their
computational and communication overhead.

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